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An extract from The Dominance and Monopolies Review, 10th edition
While conduct constituting private monopolisation may be either exclusionary conduct or controlling conduct, the former is at the heart of such conduct, and one should also be mindful of the following: it is highly likely that the JFTC makes its decisions regarding private monopolisation not only by paying attention to the anticompetitive nature of each such conduct, but also by considering overall the strength and weakness of factors such as (1) the company's power in the market; (2) the anticompetitive nature of the conduct that is viewed with suspicion; and (3) the effect on the relevant market, as well as the causal relationship between the three, and further, taking into account the existence or absence of any pro-competitive effects, the extent thereof.
For point (1), the JFTC takes into account not only the company's market share itself, but also the characteristics of the market, the difference in share between the company and the player ranking second in the market, and where necessary, the extent of excess profits, the existence of potential new entrants, brand strength and so on.
Concerning point (2), while the Supreme Court has proposed 'practices of an artificial nature which deviate from methods of normal competition', this can simply be taken to mean anticompetitiveness. The extent of the anticompetitive nature of a conduct can be taken instead to mean the extent of the deviation from normal competition based on price and quality, that is to say from competition on the merits of the relevant products or services.
The effect on the relevant market (point (3)) refers to effects such as competitors failing to enter or being delayed in entering a market, withdrawing therefrom, experiencing fluctuations in their share, or increases or decreases in customer trading.
Because points (1) to (3) act on each other, if an anticompetitive effect is quantitatively assessed and given a numerical value, the anticompetitive effect is likely determined not through a summing up of such values, but by multiplying them and subtracting any pro-competitive effects instead. Once this is understood, the following examples become easier to comprehend.
In the Private Monopolisation Guidelines, four typical examples of exclusionary conduct constituting private monopolisation are given:
While this is a simple way to classify such conduct, a much more broad and diverse range of types of conduct can be given. Additionally, the following classification of conduct is based on the JFTC's law applied to actual cases; however, this is fluid, and dependent on the details of each case. In many cases, if private monopolisation applies, this also constitutes a type of unfair business practice. However, the converse is not true.
As the JFTC has tended to enforce the regulations on private monopolisation in waves, it is worth looking back at previous events to understand the current situation in Japan. There were no such cases between 1972 and 1996, and prior to 1972 there were only a few. During this period, conduct that met the requirements for private monopolisation was regulated as an unfair business practice, as it was generally understood to be at the time, for which the evidential burden was low.
From 1996 to 2009, private monopolisation was actively enforced, with one case a year on average. However, the JFTC lost the JASRAC case. JASRAC, which was the monopolistic managing operator for music copyright in Japan, was initially determined by the JFTC in 200942 to have committed a violation of private monopolisation by adopting a blanket collection method for broadcaster licensing fees, whereby it charged a fee by applying its prescribed rate to broadcasters' broadcasting business revenue as a comprehensive licence for all music managed by JASRAC, regardless of the number of times that music was actually used.
JASRAC contested the cease and desist order in the hearing procedure43 held by the JFTC, which resulted in the JFTC taking the highly unusual step of revoking its own cease and desist order of violation.44
While it seemed the matter would then be concluded, an action for revocation of administrative disposition was subsequently brought against the JFTC by JASRAC's competitor, e-License, which claimed that it was excluded by JASRAC. The Tokyo High Court and the Supreme Court both determined that exclusionary conduct had taken place, and the case was referred back to the JFTC.45
In 2016, the case finally came to a close, with the withdrawal of JASRAC's petition for redress, and during the period from 2009 to 2016, shackled as it was by its ongoing conflict with JASRAC, the JFTC did not expose any cases of private monopolisation, with the exception of one small and local case of a controlling-type private monopolisation. However, in recent years, the JFTC has become more active again. It has exposed a string of cases that are fascinating from a competition law standpoint (see Section II).
According to the Private Monopolisation Guidelines, a price is highly likely to constitute exclusionary conduct where it is lower than the 'costs required to supply the product', which is a similar concept to average variable costs. On the other hand, where the price is lower than the total costs required to supply a product, but greater than the 'costs which do not arise if the product is not supplied', and there are no special circumstances such as that the product is being supplied over a long period of time and in high volume, there is a low possibility of such pricing constituting exclusionary conduct.
The USEN Corporation case46 is a typical example of this. USEN Corporation, which had a market-leading share in cable music broadcasting to retail offices (68 per cent, rising to 72 per cent as a result of exclusionary conduct), lowered the monthly listening fee that it charged to customers of its largest rival, Cansystem (26 per cent, decreasing to 20 per cent as a result of USEN's exclusionary conduct) as a condition of the customers switching to use its own service, and also extended its promotional campaign to those customers (whereby those monthly fees were made free) from the standard three months to six, and so was determined to have engaged in exclusionary conduct.
Margin squeeze means conduct whereby a company that does business in both an upstream market and a downstream market tries to bring the price of an upstream product close to that of a downstream product. In some cases, it is regulated as a refusal to deal.
The Supreme Court's judgment in NTT East is a typical example of this. When providing new communication services using fibre optics to detached residential properties, NTT East, which owns more than 70 per cent of the fibre optic lines in the east Japan region, provided users with such communication services under a system whereby one person used a single fibre optic line (central wire direct connection system). However, the fact that the usage fee for this was less than the connection fee for other communications providers, when using the same central wire direct connection system, was treated as them being excluded. While the monthly usage fee was ¥5,800, the monthly connection fee was ¥6,328.47
In Nordion, the Canadian company Nordion, which held the majority of global production volume and a large part of the sales for Molybdenum 99 (a substance used in radiation therapy) and 100 per cent of the market share in Japan, required its Japanese business partners to purchase all of the products they required from it over the course of 10 years, and accordingly was found to have excluded its competitors.48 This is an exclusive purchasing obligation, which is one type of exclusive dealing.
See Section II regarding exclusive dealing by Mainami Aviation Services, to whom a cease and desist order was issued on 7 June 2020 and a surcharge payment order was issued on 19 February 2021. Mainami Aviation Services appealed for revocation of both administrative orders to the Tokyo District Court. On 10 February 2022, the Tokyo District Court dismissed the claims.
The Private Monopolisation Guidelines attempt to draw a line under whether conduct is illegal by listing a diverse range of factors, including loyalty rebates, but are unsuccessful in doing so. As such, analysis of exclusionary conduct is at a developing stage, whereby factors such as the discount aspect of rebates and pro-competitive effects are also taken into account.
A representative example of this is Intel.49 Intel, which has a larger share of the market for central processing units (CPUs) installed in computers (rising from 76 to 89 per cent as a result of exclusionary conduct), provided its business partner computer manufacturers with rebates, etc., on the condition that they would use Intel CPUs for 90 to 100 per cent of their computers, and would not use CPUs from Intel's competitor, AMD (with a share of 22 per cent falling to 10 per cent as a result of Intel's exclusionary conduct), for computers with a high production volume. Intel's conduct in causing them not to adopt the CPUs of its competitor was deemed to be exclusionary.
There are some situations in which various different types of exclusionary conduct are mixed together, or combine to form a consecutive series.
NIPRO 50 is a typical example of mixed conduct. In this case, NAIGAI Group, a business partner of NIPRO that produces and sells glass tubes for use in ampoules (and has a share of 85 per cent), began dealing in non-Japanese-made glass tubes, which were competitor products to NIPRO's. To restrain the expansion of NAIGAI's dealing in such glass tubes, and with the intention of imposing sanctions on it, NIPRO raised the sale price for glass tubes to NAIGAI Group only (price discrimination); refused to accept orders placed by NAIGAI Group (refusal to deal); and required NAIGAI Group alone to provide security or to settle invoices with cash payments (abuse of superior bargaining position).
The JFTC decided that exclusionary conduct had taken place after taking into account a series of conducts by NIPRO over four years. While NIPRO was the first case of private monopolisation in which the JFTC's findings were contested, it also alleged in the course of the hearing as a preliminary claim that NIPRO's same series of conducts also constituted unfair business practices.51
As NAIGAI Group had not decreased its dealings in imported glass tubes despite such course of conduct, NIPRO was able to exclude the imported tubes, but only slightly, and accordingly, the JFTC added an allegation of unfair business practices, which have a low evidential burden and for which it is sufficient to show that there was a likelihood of impeding fair competition. Finally, the JFTC returned to its claim of private monopolisation and won its case.
Hokkaido Shimbun52 is also an interesting example of a mixed conduct case. The Hokkaido Shimbun newspaper covered the entire Hokkaido area, and had a dominant position even within newspaper sales in the Hakodate region (which is located within the Hokkaido area). Given that Hakodate Shimbun was established in the same region with the aim of publishing an evening paper, Hokkaido Shimbun both filed a trademark on title lettering that the new market entrant, Hakodate Shimbun newspaper, was likely to use, and also greatly reduced its newspaper advertising fees in the same region and put pressure on the press agency not to broadcast news to Hakodate Shimbun. It further demanded that TV stations would not broadcast its commercials. This conduct was treated as Hakodate Shimbun being excluded.
Other examples of mixed conduct are outlined below. While these types of conduct are difficult to typify under the Private Monopolisation Guidelines, they are clear examples of exclusionary conduct.
In Japan Medical Foods Association, the Association, which exclusively carried out inspection work on medical food products (that is, it had a share of 100 per cent) through the public inspections system, colluded with Nisshin Healthcare Food Service Co, Ltd, a primary seller of food products for medical use, to construct a production and sale system that made it clearly difficult for new players to enter the market, such as requiring registration for medical food products and certification for production plants, and so was deemed to have excluded new market participants from producing and selling medical food products.53
In Pachinko Machine Production Patent Pool, 10 pachinko machine producers that held key patents on the manufacturing of these machines (and together held approximately 90 per cent of the pachinko machine market), and that had gathered their patents together and were managing them as a patent 'pool', were deemed to have committed exclusionary conduct for not granting new participants licence rights to those patents.54
In Paramount Bed, Paramount Bed placed pressure on the person in the Tokyo metropolitan government in charge of placing orders for medical-use beds (Paramount had an almost 100 per cent share of this market) to enable delivery only of beds for which Paramount Bed had utility model rights, so that competing providers could not supply other beds, and accordingly was found to have committed exclusionary conduct.55
There are few cases concerning controlling-type conduct; nor are there any guidelines thereon from the JFTC. An example that constitutes controlling is a company using a given investment in another company to restrict its sales areas against its wishes, and to prohibit the establishment of new factories.56 Also, while there are very few examples of this (just five cases to date), cases such as the Japan Medical Foods case and the Paramount Bed case involved both exclusionary conduct and controlling conduct. Since the Toyo Seikan case, there has been only one case of controlling conduct alone – the 2015 Fukui Agricultural Cooperative case.
While Fukui Agricultural Cooperative 57 is a controlling-type case, the scale thereof was small, and it was extremely local in nature. Furthermore, this case could be treated as bid rigging.
In Hokkaido Electric Power, the company set different fees for returning consumers that were higher than those for new consumers, and accordingly the JFTC issued a warning on suspicion of price discrimination.58
The JFTC has made it clear to the energy industry (including electricity and gas) that it will proactively investigate the situation going forward.
Microsoft Japan licensed its word processing software, Word, to computer manufacturers together with Excel (the spreadsheet software for which it has the leading market share) at the same time as licensing the latter, and accordingly was deemed to have engaged in tying.59 Following this, Ichitaro, competing word processing software, suffered a notable reduction in its market share.
The Microsoft case is a typical example of this. Microsoft US was found to have created an anticompetitive effect in the computer audiovisual technology market by including in its contracts for licensing Windows (its core software for PCs) original equipment manufacturer (OEM) sales provisions whereby the OEM providers entering into those contracts promised not to sue Microsoft or other OEM providers for breaches of patent infringement by Windows (non-assertion provisions), and so this conduct was found to constitute trading subject to restrictive conditions.60
In the decision, it was determined that the non-assertion provisions were extremely unreasonable given that it enabled the OEM providers' worldwide patents to be incorporated into the Windows series for free, and accordingly that there was a high probability of OEM providers losing the desire to research and develop new computer audiovisual technology.
In addition, given that the OEM providers and Microsoft are competitors in the computer audiovisual technology market, the OEM providers would, as a result of the non-assertion provisions, lose the desire to research and develop computer audiovisual technology if they had such powerful technology in their possession, and accordingly, their position would be weakened, while on the other hand, Microsoft could rapidly and widely distribute its computer audiovisual technology on a global scale by installing it within the Windows series.
Accordingly, it was determined that the non-assertion provisions had a likelihood of excluding competition in the computer audiovisual market, or causing it to stagnate, and so there was a high probability of an anticompetitive effect being extended to that market.
See Section II regarding Qualcomm (the JFTC lost this case).
One-Blue, LLC manages and operates the patent pool for the standard essential patents for Blu-ray disc standards. Despite declaring that it would license these under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) conditions, it did not reach an agreement with Imation Corporation, which wished to receive a licence under the FRAND conditions, and furthermore told its business partners that the Blu-ray discs produced and sold by Imation would infringe One-Blue's patent rights. Accordingly, this conduct was determined to constitute unfair interference with a competitor's transactions.61
Amazon Japan was found to have included in its seller display contracts for Amazon Marketplace (its electronic shopping mall) a most-favoured nation (MFN) clause that required sellers to set prices and terms and conditions for products sold by them on Amazon Marketplace at whichever were the most favourable prices and terms and conditions of the same product as sold by other sales routes, and accordingly was investigated by the JFTC on suspicion of trading subject to restrictive conditions.62 However, as Amazon Japan made a petition to the effect that it would take voluntary measures itself, and those measures, including deleting MFN clauses from the contracts and not introducing the clauses in new contracts, dispelled the suspicion, the JFTC broke off its investigation.63 It could be said that Amazon took commitment procedures in advance.
DeNA, an online game platform that uses mobile phone and social network services (SNS), was ranked top in sales of SNS game software and was also in hot pursuit of its rival, Gree. DeNA planned to disrupt SNS game developers from providing software to Gree by eliminating their links to the DeNA platform when they provided software to Gree. DeNA was determined to have engaged in unfair interference with a competitor's transactions.64
The provisions on unfair business practices contain prohibitions on abuse of superior bargaining position that are unique to Japan, even though somewhat similar regulations had been introduced in various competition laws of other countries. One aspect of these provisions is the traditional Japanese industrial policy of protecting small and medium-sized companies, and, while they are somewhat hard to understand in terms of pure competition law theory, the JFTC makes frequent use of these provisions, therefore making them a key part of the regulations against unfair business practices.65 It is enough for a company to have a superior bargaining position relative to its suppliers, and there is neither any need for the relevant company to have market power nor to have a strong position in the relevant market. Of course, if such elements exist, the possibility of the company being targeted by the JFTC will increase.
As such, the company is an important trading partner for suppliers; if they have a relationship with such company whereby they must accept any demand made by the company, no matter how unreasonable, the company in question will be deemed to have a superior bargaining position. Theoretically, the key factor in finding a superior bargaining position is the degree of dependence by the supplier on the transaction with the company, and the degree of dependence is generally evaluated by dividing the supplier's volume of sales to the company by the supplier's total amount of sales. However, in practice, the JFTC often finds dependency, even if the ratio is less than 5 per cent.
The rules primarily regulate against large companies, such as mass electronics retailers, supermarkets, department stores and home and convenience stores, demanding cooperation fees or support money from their suppliers, requiring them to dispatch their employees on secondment to them for free, returning products that are not faulty or reducing payments without due cause.
In 7-Eleven, involving the largest franchisor in the convenience store sector, 7-Eleven prevented franchisees from discounting unsold foods such as lunch boxes, and its conduct was deemed to be abuse of superior bargaining position.66
In Toys 'R' Us, which involved the largest Japanese retailer specialising in goods for children and infants at that time, Toys 'R' Us reduced prices and returned products to suppliers. Toys 'R' Us's conduct was deemed to be abuse of superior bargaining position.67
Note that there are no restrictions on the types of industry that may be targeted, and in the past, there have also been cases of banks being investigated. In Mitsui Sumitomo Bank, the JFTC found that Mitsui Sumitomo Bank forcing borrowers to purchase financial products was unlawful.68 Note that the JFTC tends to apply this regulation readily. Also note that the most recent order was issued in 2014 in Direx, and since then there have been no formal orders, even though the JFTC had been very active in cases against abuse of superior bargaining position. As a matter of fact, the JFTC and the investigated company have actively used commitment procedures since the introduction of such procedures. See Section VI.
There have been only five cases in which cease and desist orders and surcharge payment orders have been issued since 2010, when surcharges were incorporated for certain types of unfair business practices, including abuse of superior bargaining position. All of these cases involved abuse of superior bargaining position.
These cases illustrate that the JFTC is having difficulty arriving at surcharge figures for cases involving abuse of superior bargaining position.
Regardless of JFTC improvements in describing disadvantaged suppliers following Sanyo-Marunaka Supermarket, two judgments of the Tokyo High Court are still uncertain. Under these circumstances, although the JFTC is very active in investigating abuse of superior bargaining position, commitment procedures are the main method used for settling cases.
The services provided by digital platform operators constitute multi-sided markets with multiple user segments, and these services readily expand and promote monopolisation and oligopolisation through their characteristics such as network effects, low marginal cost and economies of scale. Furthermore, data concentration through network effects and economies of scale increases users' benefits, and also the data-based business model, as accumulating and utilising data by digital platform operators create cycles that maintain and enhance competitive advantages by further accelerating the accumulation and use of data by digital platform operators. Because some digital platform operators adopt a business model where they provide free goods and services in exchange for the acquisition or use of personal information, for purposes of accumulating data, there are some concerns over the acquisition and use of consumers' personal information by digital platform operators that provide services to consumers. If the digital platform operator's acquisition or use of personal information in unfair ways causes consumers disadvantages and adverse effects on fair and free competition, then issues under the AMA will arise. Therefore, the Guidelines describe what kind of acts related to the acquisition of personal information, or use of acquired personal information, at a digital platform of a digital platform operator will be issues concerning abuse of a superior bargaining position in view of transparency of AMA enforcement and improvement of predictability for digital platform operators. Note that if conduct described below violates other laws and regulations, interventions under these other laws and regulations will not be prevented.
Types of abuses of a superior bargaining position include:
The JFTC had been investigating Apple Inc (Apple), the ultimate parent company of Apple Japan GK, in accordance with the provisions of the AMA,71 since October 2016. Apple Japan had, based on its agreements with NTT Docomo KK, KDDI KK and SoftBank KK72 (collectively, three mobile network operators (three MNOs)), been suspected of restricting the business activities of the three MNOs regarding the following:
During the investigation, Apple reported to the JFTC that it would amend a part of the agreements. The JFTC reviewed these amendments. Consequently, on 11 July 2018, the JFTC decided to close the investigation, concluding that the amendments would eliminate the suspicion of the violation mentioned above. The JFTC's evaluations are as follows.73
Apple Japan concluded iPhone agreements with, and sold iPhones to, the three MNOs. The iPhone agreements include provisions regarding the three MNOs' purchase and sale of iPhone products, iPhone services and support provided to users purchasing iPhones, and telecommunication services provided to users purchasing iPhones. The JFTC investigated the following provisions in the iPhone agreements.
It was seen that Apple Japan obligating an MNO to order a specific order quantity of iPhones could be a problem under the AMA if, for example, it reduces the sales opportunities of other smartphone makers. However, considering the fact that a specific order quantity was not set out in the iPhone agreements except for during a limited time period, and a stipulated order quantity did not appear to oblige an MNO to order the quantity, as well as other facts, it was not recognised that Apple Japan restricted an MNO's business activities.
Apple reported to the JFTC that, when concluding a new iPhone agreement with the MNO, it would stipulate that an order quantity would be a target for the MNO and that a failure to meet an order quantity would not be a breach of contract.
It was seen that Apple Japan obligating an MNO to offer an iPhone plan only could be a problem under the AMA if, for example, it lessens competition on service plans among MNOs. However, considering the fact that it was possible for other service plans to be offered under the iPhone agreements and a stipulated iPhone plan had not been offered, as well as other facts, it was not recognised that Apple Japan restricted an MNO's business activities.
Apple reported to the JFTC that it would amend the iPhone agreements and abolish the provisions regarding iPhone plans.
Subsidies provided to users purchasing smartphones is considered to lessen the substantial costs to users in purchasing smartphones and to have promoted the wide use of smartphones. However, Apple Japan obligating an MNO to provide a certain amount of subsidy could be a problem under the AMA if, for example, it lessens competition among mobile telecommunication businesses through the smooth offering of low-price and diverse service plans, by constraining the price reduction of telecommunication services and the price combination of smartphones and telecommunication services under the current situation where MNOs bundle smartphones and telecommunication services to many users.
Apple Japan proposed to the JFTC to amend the iPhone agreements with the three MNOs so that they may offer (even if users purchasing iPhones subscribed to a term contract) service plans without subsidies (alternate plans) on the condition that the three MNOs provide clear, fair and informed choices to users in their selection of either service plans with subsidies (standard plans) or alternate plans and other conditions. Apple Japan agreed on such amendments with the three MNOs and then reported them to the JFTC.
Even after the implementation of the above amendments, the three MNOs' obligation to provide subsidies to users purchasing iPhones would still partly remain. However, it would become possible for the three MNOs to offer alternate plans to users, which would not breach the iPhone agreements with Apple Japan. However, as long as the three MNOs' sales promotion activities of alternate plans were not hindered, it was considered that such marketing would provide users with the optimal service plan choice, promoting competition among telecommunication businesses. Considering these points, it was recognised that the amendments would eliminate the suspicion of the violation of the AMA.
The JFTC had investigated Apple Inc (Apple) in accordance with the provisions of the AMA since October 2016. Apple had been suspected of restricting business activities, such as selling digital content (music, e-books, videos, etc.), of enterprises (developers) that distribute applications (apps) based on App Store Review Guidelines (Guidelines) as Apple operates App Store, where the developers distribute apps for iPhone.
During the JFTC's investigation, Apple proposed to take measures such as revising the Guidelines related to the alleged conduct above. As a result of the JFTC's review on this proposal, on 2 September 2021, the JFTC recognised it would eliminate the above-mentioned suspicion, and decided to close the investigation on this case after the JFTC confirms the measure has been taken.74
The volume of smartphone shipments in Japan exceeds 30 million per year and iPhones supplied by Apple Japan G K have a 46.5 per cent market share.
App Store is the only place where iPhone users are able to download native apps. Apple has published the Guidelines with which apps in the App Store are to comply and reviews these apps based on the Guidelines. In the process of review, when Apple finds that an app does not comply with the Guidelines, the app may not be allowed to be distributed via App Store (hereinafter, Apple's judgement that an app does not comply with the Guidelines is referred to as a 'rejection').
Apple, based on the Guidelines, requires developers to use the means of payment that Apple specifies (hereinafter, IAP) for sales of digital content, etc., within the apps, and charges developers with fees that amount to 15 or 30 per cent of sales made through IAP.
The market sizes of music streaming services, e-books distribution services and video streaming services offered through the internet are as follows: ¥78.3 billion, ¥456.9 billion and ¥320 billion, respectively.
In the sectors of music streaming, e-books, video streaming services for smartphones (hereinafter referred to as music streaming services, etc.), developers have difficulty cutting costs further in general because of heavy burdens, such as copyright fees for content holders.
Some developers of music streaming services, etc., distribute apps that are used not to sell their digital content but mainly to listen to, read and watch the digital content (hereinafter referred to as reader apps) that users have bought through, inter alia, websites. Some of these developers sell their digital content, etc., only through websites.
Apple distributes its own apps for music streaming services, etc., and sells, inter alia, digital content as well.
The Guidelines stipulate that developers are required to use IAP for sales of, inter alia, digital content, and prohibits the inclusion of external links or buttons within the app to induce consumers into purchases other than using IAP.
Digital content, etc., is also distributed outside of apps, such as on websites. Therefore, consumers may visit developers' websites where businesses distribute such content and pay for it. As such, providing sales channels using means of payment other than IAP may create a price-reduction effect, and consequently benefit consumers.
In the situation described above, prohibiting developers from including an in-app link could be a problem under the Antimonopoly Act because it raises concerns about developers' sales channels using means of payment other than IAP, such as insufficient functions and the abandonment of their introduction.
After the JFTC pointed out the concerns described above in the process of this investigation, Apple reported to the JFTC that it would take measures to allow developers to include an in-app link within reader apps9" lang="ja-JP of music streaming services, etc., and to revise the Guidelines. Apple also reported that it would take the same measures for developers of reader apps of digital magazines and newspapers in addition to music streaming services, etc.
According to Apple's report, developers will be able to display the links for their own websites on their reader apps, and thus the concerns that it prevents developers from providing sales channels using means of payment other than IAP will be eliminated.
Therefore, the JFTC recognised that the measure proposed by Apple outlined above would eliminate the suspicion of a violation of the AMA in music streaming services, etc.
The JFTC recognised that the measure proposed by Apple mentioned above would eliminate the suspected violation of the AMA, and decided to close the investigation on this case after confirming that the measure has been actually taken.
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